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Mid-day Meal Program and Incidence of Child Labour in a Developing 
Economy 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The incidence of child labour is one of the major problems facing the developing world in the 
liberalized economic regime. The economists and policymakers are in search of policies that can 
bring down this problem satisfactorily. In the theoretical literature, the supply of child labour has 
largely been attributed to two factors: abject poverty and capital market imperfection. Basu and 
Van (1998) and Basu (1999) have explained child labour using the poverty argument while 
Ranjan (1999, 2001), Baland and Robinson (2000) and Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) emphasize the 
importance of capital-market imperfection as a contributing factor to inefficient child labour.  
 
For eliminating the incidence of child labour, the World Development Report 1995 called for a 
multifaceted approach with programs that lessen poverty and increase income security, reduce 
education costs, and improve the quality of schooling. However, policy prescriptions directed 
towards poverty alleviation are difficult to be implemented properly due to various bottlenecks 
and vicious circles typical of developing economies; even if implemented, they take a long time 
to mitigate the problem. Despite high economic growth, resulting from implementation of 
economic reforms during the last two decades, poverty has increased in many liberalizing 
economies1 and the incidence of child labour has not decreased satisfactorily. It is, therefore, 
believed that the betterment of educational opportunities and a policy of compulsory education 
designed for human capital formation can more effectively remove children from work.  
 
Governments all over the world devote substantial resources to their education sector. This is 
especially true in developing countries. In 1995, public spending on education accounted for 
15.7% of total government expenditure in developing countries (see Bedi and Garg (2000)).  
Furthermore, the majority of students in developing countries are educated in publicly funded and 
publicly managed educational institutions. According to Jimenez and Lockheed (1995), almost 
90% of all primary and 70% of all secondary enrollments in developing countries are in public 
schools. 
                                                 
1 See Khan (1998) and Tendulkar et al. (1996) among others. 
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In the public education system in the developing economies there are provisions for the children 
to get stipend, free educational goods and free mid-day meals. These policies are designed to 
mitigate the problem of child labour by keeping them in school. Economic incentives alone are 
not generally very effective in increasing school attendance. However, according to ILO (1999) 
these schemes are extremely important in raising education levels and should be employed in the 
developing countries with child labour more as a means to offset the income loss incurred by 
sending a child to school. Incentives can be in the form of free meals to students, food to the 
student’s family, cash stipend and free uniforms and books. These schemes are expected to lower 
the incidence of child labour by lowering the forgone effective child wage income as well as by 
raising the future earnings potential of the children attending school through human capital 
formation.  
The present paper intends to examine the consequence of mid-day meal program and/or provision 
for cash stipend to school attending children on the incidence of child labour in a developing 
economy using a three-sector general equilibrium model. The supply function of child labour of 
each working family is derived from its intertemporal utility-maximizing behaviour. Sector 1 in 
the general equilibrium model is agriculture where child labour is used along with adult unskilled 
labour and capital. Sector 2 is the low-skill manufacturing sector that uses adult unskilled labour 
and capital. Finally, sector 3 employs skilled labour and capital to produce a high-skill 
commodity. In this setup, we shall examine the consequence of the mid-day meal program or 
cash stipend scheme on the aggregate supply of child labour in the society. We identify the 
different channels through which the policy affects the prevalence of the evil in the system. We 
have found that the policy may be counterproductive as it lowers both the initial incomes of the 
working families and the return to education. Direct cash payments to the working families 
instead of mid-day meal program are likely to be effective in eradicating the problem of child 
labour. 
2.  Derivation of supply function of child labour 
 
The supply function of child labour by each working family is determined from its intertemporal 
utility maximizing behaviour. Let us consider a two period optimizing problem of the 
representative working family consisting of one adult member (the guardian) and a child. The 
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guardian in the first period works in the adult labour market and earns a wage 0W .
2 In this period, 
he takes decision about his child’s work effort and schooling. Total child time is 1, a part of 
which ( )Cl is sent out to work at the wage rate CW . Non-existence of a market for loans against 
future earnings compels the parent to use income from child work to smooth out the family 
consumption3. Time not spent on working is spent in school4. Hence (1 )Cl− is the child’s 
schooling. There are provisions for midday meals and cash stipend for children attending school, 
the monetary value of which is b per unit of child labour time spent in school. So, Cl part of the 
child labour time earns the child wage ,( ),CW in the first period and the unskilled adult 
wage ( )W in the second period while (1 )Cl− fraction earns b in the first period and the skilled 
wage ( )SW in the second period.
5 We assume that CW b> , otherwise no children will be sent out 
to work. In the presence of positive return on education, SW is greater than W . In the second 
period, the guardian earns nothing and lives on the income he receives from his child who has 
become an adult worker by this time.  
 
We assume that the parent cares only about the lifetime family consumption and does not attach  
any value to the child’s leisure. The utility is therefore a function of consumption levels in the 
two periods (1and 2 ) and is represented as follows.  
1 2C CU
ρ ρ
βρ ρ
− −
= +− −         ∞<<− ρ1        (1) 
                                                 
2 0W can take two values, W (unskilled wage) and SW (skilled wage), depending on the type of the 
representative working household. 
 
3 There are informal credit markets in developing countries as a substitute to missing formal 
credit market, but they mainly deal with short-term loans. Poor households need long-term credit 
to be able to substitute for the foregone earnings of their children, which is missing in the 
developing countries. See for example, Baland and Robinson (2000), Jafery and Lahiri (2002), 
Ranjan (1999, 2001) in this context. 
 
4 This is a simplifying assumption that ignores the existence of non-labour non-school goers. 
 
5 Introduction of uncertainty in securing a skilled job in the second period would be an interesting 
theoretical exercise. However, the major results of the model still hold if the probability in 
finding a high-skill job is given exogenously.  
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β is the time discount factor and )
1
1( ρ+ is the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
 
The first period’s consumption ( 1C ) consists of wage income of the guardian, child wage income 
from the working time of the child and the pecuniary value of mid-day meal and cash stipend 
received from child labour time spent in school i.e., 
1 0( (1 ))C C CC W l W b l= + + −         (2)                                          
The second period’s consumption ( 2C ) can be thought of as the sum of skilled wage of educated 
adult (schooled in the first period) labour and unskilled wage of uneducated adult labour (worked 
in the first period).  
2 ( (1 ) )C C SC l W l W= + −                                                              (3) 
We assume that the only cost of education is the opportunity cost in terms of forgone earnings of 
children.6 
 
The guardian maximizes the lifetime utility (Equation (1)) with respect to Cl and subject to (2) 
and (3). Maximization gives the following first-order condition. 
                                     (4) 
 
Solving equation (4) the following child labour function by each working family is obtained.  
1/(1 )
0
1/(1 )
( )( )
( )
                                                                     (5)
( )( ) ( )
( )
S
S
C
C
S
C S
C
W WW W b
W b
l
W WW b W W
W b
ρ
ρ
β
β
+
+
 −− +  − =
 −− + − − 
 
For algebraic simplicity we consider the special case where 0=ρ  which means a logarithmic 
utility function with unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution7. The child labour supply 
function of the household then reduces to: 
                                                 
6 Here the opportunity cost of sending children to school is the effective child wage rate, 
( )CW b− . One can, of course, incorporate direct schooling cost without affecting the qualitative 
results of the model. 
 
(1 )
0
( (1 ) ) ( )
( ( )) ( )
C C S S
C C C
l W l W W W
W b l W b W b
ρ β+ + − −= + + − − 
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0( )
(1 )( ) (1 )( )
S
C
S C
W W bl
W W W b
β
β β
+= −+ − + −                             (6) 
 
Let us now discuss the properties of the child labour function given by (6). An increase in current 
income 0, ,W (income from non-child source) raises both 1C and 2C and hence lowers Cl following 
a positive income effect. An increase in the child wage rate implies an increase in the opportunity 
cost of education and hence leads to more child labour supply (i.e. less schooling). An increase in 
the pecuniary benefits from the mid-day meal program lowers the effective child wage rate, 
thereby leading to less child labour. Any changes in skilled and/or unskilled wages impinge on 
the return on education and therefore influence the guardian’s decision regarding allocation of 
child time between his education and work. For example, an increase in skilled wage ( )SW  or a 
decrease in unskilled wage ( )W makes education more attractive and raises schooling time of the 
child thereby lowering the supply of child labour by the household.  
 
 
3. The General Equilibrium Analysis 
 
We consider a small open economy with three sectors. Sector 1 produces an agricultural 
commodity, 1X , using adult unskilled labour ( )L , child labour ( )CL and capital ( )K . The capital-
output ratio in sector 1, 1,Ka  is assumed to be technologically given.
8 Sector 2 uses unskilled 
labour and capital to produce a low-skill commodity, 2X .
9 Finally, sector 3 produces a high-skill 
commodity 3, ,X with the help of skilled labour ( )S  and capital. Commodity prices , s,iP  are given 
by the small open economy assumption. Competitive markets, CRS technologies with 
diminishing marginal productivities of inputs and full-employment of resources are assumed.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 See Ranjan (1999) for a similar treatment. 
8 Although this is a simplifying assumption it is not completely without any basis. Agriculture 
requires inputs like fertilizers, pesticides, weedicides etc. which are to be used in recommended 
doses. Now if capital is used to purchase those inputs, the capital-output ratio becomes constant 
technologically. However, labour and capital are substitutes and the production function displays 
the property of constant returns to scale in these two inputs. 
 
9 Even if sector 2 is allowed to use child labour the results of model hold under different 
sufficient conditions. See footnote 15 for more details. 
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The usual price-unit cost equality conditions relating to the three sectors are as follows. 
 
1 1 1 1L C C KWa W a Ra P+ + =           (7)                                        
2 2 2L KWa Ra P+ =             (8)  
3 3 3S S KW a Ra P+ =                                                                                                                   (9) 
where sjia are input-output ratios; and, R is the return to capital. 
 
Complete utilization of adult unskilled labour, child labour, capital and skilled labour imply the 
following four equations, respectively. 
LXaXa LL =+ 2211                                                                                                             (10) 
1 1C Ca X L=                                                                                                             (11) 
1 1 2 2 3 3K K Ka X a X a X K+ + =                                                                                               (12)    
SXaS =33                                                                                                                             (13) 
where ,L K and S denote exogenously given endowments of adult labour, capital and skilled 
labour, respectively. CL  is the endowment of child labour which is endogenously determined. 
 
Both unskilled and skilled working families are potential suppliers of child labour and their 
current wage incomes 0( )W are  and ,SW W respectively. Using equation (6) the aggregate child 
labour supply in the economy is obtained as follows.  
( )1 ( )( )[ ]
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S S S
C
S C S C
W W W bW bL L S
W W W b W W W b
ββ
β
   ++= − + −   + − − − −   
       (14) 
 
 
4. Comparative Statics 
 
The general equilibrium structure consists of eight equations ((7) – (14)) and the same number of 
variables, namely; 1 2 3, , , , , ,  and .C S CW W W R X X X L  This is an indecomposable production 
structure. So factor prices depend on both commodity prices and factor endowments. Given the 
child wage rate, sectors 1 and 2 together can be viewed as a miniature Heckscher-Ohlin system as 
they use both adult unskilled labour and capital. It is sensible to assume that sector 1 is more adult 
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labour-intensive than sector 2 with respect to capital. Totally differentiating equations (7) – (14) 
and solving by Cramer’s rule the following proposition can be established.10  
Proposition 1: A mid-day meal program and/or cash stipend to school attending children leads to 
(i) a fall in the adult wage; (ii) an increase in the child wage; and, (iii) a decrease in the skilled 
wage rate. The policy improves the skilled-unskilled wage inequality iff the high-skill sector is 
capital-intensive (in a special sense) relative to the low-skill sector.  
 
Proposition 1 can be verbally explained as follows. An increase in the pecuniary value of mid-day 
meal and/or cash stipend, ceteris paribus, lowers the effective child wage, ( )CW b− , which in 
turn lowers the aggregate supply of child labour initially. This raises the child wage rate, CW . As 
the child wage rate rises, the effective price of commodity 1, net of cost on child labour, falls. 
This produces a Stolper-Samuelson effect in the Heckscher-Ohlin subsystem (HOSS). The return 
to capital , ,R rises while the adult unskilled wage , ,W falls as sector 1 is more adult labour-
intensive than sector 2 with respect to capital. A Rybczynski-type effect takes place subsequently 
and leads to a contraction of sector 1 and an expansion of sector 2.11 The amount of capital 
released by sector 1 is inadequate for the expansion of sector 2. So sector 3 also has to release 
capital to the expanding sector 2. Sector 3 contracts for scarcity of capital. The demand for skilled 
labour falls that lowers the skilled wage, SW . What happens to the skilled-unskilled wage 
inequality depends on the rates of decrease in SW andW which in turn depend on the distributive 
shares of capital in the two sectors. If the high-skill sector (sector 3) is capital-intensive in a 
special sense12 the increase in cost on capital input in sector 3 is more than that in the low-skill 
sector (sector 2), which in turn, implies a decrease in the relative wage inequality. 
 
                                                 
10 This has been proved in Appendix I. 
 
11 See Appendix I for detailed mathematical proof. 
 
12 Here sectors 2 and 3 use two different types of labour. However, there is one intersectorally 
mobile input which is capital. So, these two sectors cannot be classified in terms of factor 
intensities which is usually done in the Hechscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. Despite this, a special 
type of factor intensity classification in terms of the relative distributive shares of the mobile 
factor i.e. capital can be made for analytical purposes. The sector in which this share is higher 
relative to the other may be considered as capital-intensive in a special sense. See Jones and 
Neary (1984) for details. 
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We are now going to analyze the consequence of the mid-day meal program/cash stipend scheme 
on the incidence of child labour in the society. Totally differentiating equation (14) and using the 
results of proposition 1 the following proposition can be established.13 
Proposition 2: The mid-day meal program and/or cash stipend scheme for the school attending 
children will increase the supply of child labour in the economy if (i) sector 3 is capital-intensive; 
and, (ii) the effective child wage does not fall. Direct cash payments to the working families are 
likely to be effective in mitigating the problem of child labour. 
 
We explain proposition 2 in the following way. The aggregate supply of child labour in the 
economy depends negatively on the initial incomes of the families as well as on the return on 
education while it depends positively on the effective child wage and the endowments of the two 
types of adult labour. As stated in proposition 1, the mid-day meal program lowers both the 
skilled wage, SW , and the adult unskilled wage,W , but raises the child wage rate, CW . However, 
the outcome on the effective child wage, ( )CW b− , is uncertain. All these factors affect the supply 
of child labour in different ways. First, the supply of child labour by each family rises via the 
negative income effect as the initial incomes from non-child source of both types of working 
families have decreased. Secondly, the supply of child labour increases if the return on education 
falls. The wage inequality and hence the return on education will fall if sector 3 is capital-
intensive. Finally, the consequence of any changes in the effective child wage on the supply of 
child labour is ambiguous. However, if the effective wage of child labour, ( )CW b− , does not fall, 
the incidence of child labour in the economy rises as all the three effects work together to raise 
the supply of child labour. Even when ( )CW b− falls, the incidence of child labour may increase 
if the sum of the first two effects dominates over the effective child wage effect.  
 
On the contrary, direct cash payments to the child labour supplying families will raise their initial 
incomes and exert downward pressure on the supply of child labour through the positive income 
effect. There will be no other effects as the wage rates do not change. Hence this policy is likely 
to be capable in lowering the prevalence of the evil in the system. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 This has been proved in Appendix II. 
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5.  Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has explained how economic incentive schemes designed to keep children in school 
might fail in controlling the child labour problem in the society. The family supply function of 
child labour has been derived from the intertemporal utility maximizing behaviour of the working 
households which send some of their children to the job market for consumption smoothing 
owing to non-existence of a market for loans against future earnings. Then the aggregate supply 
function of child labour has been derived and a three-sector general equilibrium model has been 
developed for the purpose of analysis. The interesting result is that economic incentive schemes 
like the mid-day meal program and provision for cash stipend might exert an upward pressure on 
the incidence of child labour by lowering both the return on education and the initial incomes of 
the working population. Therefore, the gravity of the problem may increase due to both negative 
income effect and decreased return on education even if the effective child wage falls. Direct cash 
payments to the working families are likely to be effective in the present setup because the policy 
raises the initial incomes of these families including the cash transfer and lowers the supply of 
child labour through the positive income effect. 
 
There are certain assumptions of the model that may seem to be restrictive. The model 
presupposes that the quality of education is good and that the children attending school in the 
present period will get jobs in the high-skill sector in future14. However, the quality of basic 
education in the developing countries is generally unsatisfactory and there is also unemployment 
of educated workers. Besides, the assumption that child labour is used only in the agricultural 
sector is simplifying.15 Despite this simplicity and abstraction, the results of the theoretical 
analysis presented in this paper seem to be interesting because its results question the desirability 
of the mid-day meal program and/or provision for cash stipend in eliminating the problem of 
child labour in the developing countries. 
                                                 
14 Introduction of uncertainty in securing a skilled job in the second period would be an 
interesting theoretical exercise. It may, however, be checked that the results of the model hold if 
the probability in finding a high-skill job is given exogenously.  
 
 
15 This assumption may be justified on the ground that more than 70 per cent of economically 
active children in the developing countries are engaged in agriculture and allied sectors and less 
than 9 per cent are involved in manufacturing (ILO (2002) report). However, even if sector 2 uses 
child labour the results of this paper hold under different sufficient conditions involving relative 
intensities in which child labour and other two inputs are used in the first two sectors.  
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Appendix I: 
 
Totally differentiating equations (7) – (9) and using envelope conditions the following 
expressions are obtained. 
0ˆˆˆ 111 =++ RWW KCCL θθθ                                                                         (A.1) 
0ˆˆ 22 =+ RW KL θθ                                                                                   (A.2) 
0ˆˆ 33 =+ RW KSS θθ                                                                          (A.3) 
where: =jiθ distributive share of the j th input in the i th sector; and, =∧'' proportional change. 
 
Totally differentiating equations (10) – (14), collecting terms and simplifying we get the 
following expressions. 
 0ˆˆˆˆˆ 2211
1
1 =++++ XXRSWSWS LLLKCLCLLL λλλ                                                            (A.4) 
2 1 1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0KL S K KS W A R AW X Xλ λ+ + + + =                                                                          (A.5) 
1 1
1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )CL CC C SS E W S F W GW X Hb+ + − + + = −                                                                (A.6) 
[Note that we have used RSWSX SRSSS ˆˆˆ
33
3 −−=  from (13)] 
where, 
0)( 22
1
1 <+= LLLLLLLL SSS λλ , 22 0KL K KLS Sλ= > ,  
2 3
2 3( ) 0KK K KK K KKS S Sλ λ= + < ; 22 0LK L LKS Sλ= > ; 
3 3
1 3 ( ) 0;K SK KSA S Sλ= + > 0)( 332 <−= SKKKK SSA λ  
0
)()1(
.
2 >−+= WWL
WWA
SC
S
β , 0)1( >+= CCWLB β
β
;                                                   (A.7) 
2 0;(1 ) ( )C C
D
L W b
β
β= >+ − ( ( ) );E A L S BLW= − + +
[( ) ( ) )] 0;C SF DW W b L W b S= + + + > ( ( ) ) 0;SG A L S BSW= + + >  
[( ) ( ) )] 0;C S CH Db W W L W W S= + + + >  
k
jiS = the degree of substitution between factors j and i in the k th sector, , , , ,Cj i L L K S= ; 
and, k = 1,2,3. For example, ),/)(/( 11
1
CLLCLC WaaWS ∂∂≡ )/)(/( 111 WaaWS LLLL ∂∂≡ etc. 
0>kjiS for ij ≠ ; and, ;0<kjjS 1 1 1 1( ) 0LL LC LL LCS S S S+ = ⇒ = − ; and, 
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2 2( ) 0LL LKS S+ = ; 3 3( ) 0SS SKS S+ = etc. =jiλ proportion of the j th input employed in the i th 
sector.  
 
 Equations (A.1) – (A.6) are arranged in the following matrix form.
 
1 1 1
2 2
3 3
1
1 1 2
2 1 1 2
1 1
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0
0
( ) ( ) 0 1 0
L C K
L K
K S
LL L LC LK L L
KL K K
CL CC
S S S
S A A
S E S F G
θ θ θ
θ θ
θ θ
λ λ λ
λ λ
        + −   












2
1
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
X
X
W
R
W
W
S
C
=
0
0
0
0
0
ˆHb
        −  
                                  (A.8) 
 
Solving (A.8) by Cramer’s rule we get the following expressions. 
3 1 2
ˆ
ˆ ( )( );S C K LK
bW Hθ θ θ λ= ∆                                                                                            (A.9) 
3
ˆ
ˆ ( )( );C S LK LK
bW Hθ θ λ= − ∆                                    (A.10) 
3 1 2
ˆ
ˆ ( )( );S C L LK
bR Hθ θ θ λ= − ∆                                                                                            (A.11) 
3 1 2
ˆ
ˆ ( )( );S K C L LK
bW Hθ θ θ λ= ∆ and,                                                                                     (A.12)   
1
3 2
ˆ
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )( )C LKS K K
bH
W W
θ λ θ θ− = −∆                                                                          (A.13) 
1
1 1 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 3 2 2 2 2
ˆ
ˆ ( )[ { ( )L K LC C L K L C S L LK K LLK
HbX S A S Aλ λ θ θ θ θ λ θ θ θ λ λ= + + −∆  
                                                                                   2 2 2( )}]K LL K L KLS Sθ λ λ− −                   (A.14) 
1
2 1 1 3 1 2 3 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2
ˆ
ˆ ( )[ { ( )L K S LC C L K L C S L LK K LLK
HbX S A S Aλ λ θ θ θ θ θ λ θ θ θ λ λ= − + + −∆  
                                                                                      2 1 1( )}]K LL K L KLS Sθ λ λ− −                  (A.15) 
where, 
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3 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 2{ } ( )K C L S L S C L LK K LLKBSW A S Aθ θ θ λ λ θ θ θ λ λ∆ = − + − −   
                1 13 2 1{( ) }S CC K L LCLK LKS F Sθ θ λ λ λ+ − −                
                       )}(){( 22
1
213 KLLLLKLKCLKCS
SSBLWS λλλθθθ −−+−  
                                   )()( 321 KKLKCSLA θθλθ −++                                                     (A.16)                         
0)( 2121 >−= LKKLLK λλλλλ ; and, 
0)( 2121 >−= LKKLLK θθθθθ                                                                                            (A.17)  
 
(Note that , 0
LK LK
λ θ > as sector 2 is more capital-intensive than sector 1 with respect to adult 
unskilled labour). 
 
Using (A.7) and (A.17) from (A.16) it follows that  
0<∆  if 23 KK θθ > .                                                                                                           (A.18) 
However, 23 KK θθ > is only a sufficient condition for∆ to be negative. 
  
Using (A.7), (A.16) and (A.17) from (A.9) – (A.15) we can obtain the following results. 
(i) ˆ 0W < when ˆ 0b > ;  
(ii) ˆ 0CW > when ˆ 0b > ;  
(iii) ˆ 0R > when ˆ 0b > ;  
(iv) ˆ 0SW <  when ˆ 0b > ;                                                                                             (A.19) 
(v) 1ˆ 0X < when ˆ 0b > ;  
(vi) 2ˆ 0X > when ˆ 0b > .   
(vii) ˆ ˆ( ) 0SW W− < when ˆ 0b > iff 23 KK θθ > .  
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Appendix II: 
 
We use equation (14) to examine the impact of the mid-day meal program on the incidence of 
child labour in the economy. Totally differentiating equation (14) we get 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] [( ) ( ) ]C S S C C SL W A L S BWL W A L S BW S W DW W b L W b S= + − − + + + + + +  
                                                                                                                        ˆHb−  
A little manipulation yields 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )( )C S S SL A L S W W LBWW SBW W= − + − − − ˆ [( ) ( ) ]C C SW DW W b L W b S+ + + +  
                                                                                                                               ˆHb−        (A.20) 
Using (A.9) – (A.13), the expression (A.20) may be rewritten as follows. 
 
1
3 2 3 2 3 2
ˆˆ ( )[( ) ( ) ( )]C LKC K K S K L S K
H
L A L S B W S WL b
θ λ θ θ θ θ θ θ= − − + + +∆  
                                                                                   3[ˆ1 ( )]S LK LK
F
Hb
θ θ λ− + ∆               (A.21) 
                                                                                                                     
From (A.21) it follows that ˆ 0CL > when 0b > if (i) 3 2K Kθ θ> ; and, 
(ii) 3[1 ( )] 0.S LK LK
Fθ θ λ+ ≤∆   
So, the incidence of child labour increases owing to the mid-day meal program and/or school 
enrollment subsidy under the sufficient conditions: (i) 3 2K Kθ θ> ; and, (ii) 
3[1 ( )] 0.S LK LK
Fθ θ λ+ ≤∆  
Condition (i) implies that sector 3 is capital-intensive relative to sector 2 while condition (ii) 
suggests that the effective child wage does not fall. However, the aggregate supply of child labour 
may increase even if the effective child wage falls.  
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